Journal of Development Studies 52:12

The idea that states seek to maximise their revenue collection has occupied a significant place in contemporary political economy analysis of taxation, and has helped us understand the history of state formation. It is, however, very much at variance with the daily experience of tax policy and practice. Governments are frequently revenue-sacrificers: they fail to use the functioning, legitimate tax collection systems they have available to actually collect much revenue. This paper details the case of property tax collection in Pakistan, and concludes that governments tend to maximise rule before they maximise revenue.

Authors

Muhammad Mujtaba Piracha

Dr Muhammad Mujtaba Piracha is Pakistan’s Ambassador to the World Trade Organisation in Geneva since 2019, where he is currently the Chair of the Committee on Trade and Development. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science and undertook his doctoral studies at the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex. Dr Piracha has worked across Pakistan in both the government and non-government sectors. Some of his previous assignments include Additional Chief Secretary (Services), Commissioner Lahore, Secretary Industries, Commerce, Investment and Skills Development in Punjab; Program Economist at the Aga Khan Rural Support Program; and multiple field assignments in Balochistan.

Mick Moore

Mick Moore is a Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies and the founding CEO of the International Centre for Tax and Development. He is a political economist whose broad research interests are in the domestic and international dimensions of good and bad governance in poor countries, focusing specifically on taxation in Asia and Africa.
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