Does Collecting Taxes Erode the Accountability of Informal Leaders? Evidence from the DRC
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Research in Brief 136
This paper explores how collecting taxes for the formal state impacts the accountability of city chiefs in Kananga, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). City chiefs are informal leaders selected by local notables. They are in charge of dispute resolution, local public goods provision, and the targeting of development programmes. We exploit random variation in whether city chiefs or state agents were responsible for property tax collection in 2018 in the city of Kananga.
Augustin Bergeron is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Southern
California. His research lies at the intersection of development economics, public economics and political economy.
Elie Kabue Ngindu is the research manager at ODEKA (L'Organisation d’Etudes Economiques sur le Kasai), based in Kananga, DRC. His research focuses on the economic development and culture of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Gabriel Tourek is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh. His
research focuses on the development of fiscal and state capacity, and the equity of taxes and transfers in low-income countries.
Jonathan Weigel is an assistant professor of business and public policy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California - Berkeley. His research explores the role of state capacity in development with a focus on taxation.
Citation: Bergeron, A.; Ngindu, E.K.; Tourek, G. and Weigel, J.L. (2024) Does Collecting Taxes Erode the Accountability of Informal Leaders Evidence from the DRC, ICTD Research in Brief 136, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, DOI 10.19088/ICTD.2024.087
